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Abstract
Rest upon an extensive data set on Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIEs) in
China, we investigate the role of institutional di¤erence in determining the loca-
tional choice of foreign direct investment (FDI). Estimation results using rm-level
discrete choice model suggest that FIEs from source countries that are more remote
institutionally from the Chinese mainland exhibit a higher degree of sensitivity to-
ward regional economic institutions in their choice of FDI location. Furthermore,
we nd that FIEs coming from countries with better institutions than China are
more sensitive to institutional di¤erence. Interestingly, we nd that the deterrent
e¤ct of institutional distance on FDI entry is mitigated for FIEs coming from coun-
tries with more ethnic Chinese in their overall populations.
This paper is a revision of and updates Yi Ches Ph.D. thesis (second chapter, 2013) in University of
Hong Kong. A previous version of this paper was circulated with the title: institutional di¤erence and
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1 Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is one of the driving forces behind the growth of many
developing economies around the world. China is an excellent example. Since 1978, it
has attracted more than US$500 billion FDI (China Statistical Yearbook, 2005), and the
World Bank (1997) has credited FDI as a key factor to Chinas economic growth during
this period. It is not surprising that governments of many developing economies give top
priority to attracting FDI and show tremendous interests in understanding what helps
lure FDI.
Much of the international and urban economics literature focuses on costs of business
operations, market potentials, and agglomeration economies as the determinants of FDI.
Like the choice of any investment, however, the incentive for multinationals to directly in-
vest in those developing economies depends on their expected returns. In those economies,
investment returns depend critically on the protection of property rights. Thus, an im-
portant research question is to investigate the impacts of economic institutions on FDI
location choice by multinationals.
While China is a unitary state with uniform de jure laws across the country, it is
characterized by substantial regional disparity in economic institutions, i.e., the de facto
property rights protection exhibits wide variations across regions. This o¤ers an ideal
setting to examine the impacts of economic institutions on FDI location choice. From a
data set of 6,288 U.S. multinationals investing in various regions in China for the period
of 1993-2001, Du, Lu and Tao (2008) nd that U.S. multinationals prefer to invest in
those regions that have better protection of intellectual property rights, lower degree of
government intervention in business operations, lower level of government corruption, and
better contract enforcement.
The detrimental impacts of poor economic institutions in deterring investments, how-
ever, may di¤er among multinationals from di¤erent source countries/regions. For exam-
ple, foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) from the countries/areas that are institutionally
close to the host country may easily apply their experience in dealing with bureaucrats
and government agencies in their home countries to coping with bureaucrats and gov-
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ernment entities in di¤erent regions of the host country. In contrast, FIEs from the
countries/areas that are institutionally remote from the host country may nd it di¢ -
cult to maintain frequent contacts with bureaucrats and government agencies in the host
country because their experience with home governments cannot provide a useful guide
to their endeavor in the host country. Therefore, institutional proximity can facilitate
the adaptation of FIEs to institutions in the host country. For example, China invested
1.5 percent of its capital in U.S. while invest 17.9 percent to Africa and Latin America
and 71.9 percent in Asia in 2010.
Actually, China is a country whose inward FDI comes from a rich variety of source
countries. For example, FDI in China comes from about 150 countries/areas in 2001,
including England whose institutional environment is radically di¤erent from that of
China and Korea which is institutionally much closer to China. Thus we investigate
the interactions between the quality of economic institutions in Chinas various regions
and those of FDI source countries/regions in determining FDI location choice in China.
In particular, we address the issue of whether FDI from di¤erent source countries/areas
exhibits di¤erent sensitivities to the economic institutions of host regions based on the
degree of di¤erence in institutions between home and host countries.
Even when two source countries have similar institutional distance to China, FIEs
from the two countries may have di¤erent abilities to adapt to the local business environ-
ment in China. We investigate two potential sources of this di¤erence. One is the relative
size of ethnic Chinese network in the source country and the other is the cultural distance
between the FDI source country and China. These two aspects could be interrelated to
some extent. For instance, Singapore has a very high proportion of ethnic Chinese in its
population (about 75%) and its mainstream culture is fairly close to the Chinese culture.
Although Singapore has followed British institutions and thus has a quite large insti-
tutional distance from China, the large ethnic Chinese network and cultural proximity
are expected to enable FIEs from Singapore to cope easily with the Chinese business
environment.
Nevertheless, for most FDI source countries, the ethnic Chinese network accounts for
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a rather small proportion of the overall population in the source country, and it is unlikely
to shape or a¤ect much the mainstream culture of the source country. In addition, some
countries such as Japan and Korea are fairly close to China in culture, but they have
a very small proportion of ethnic Chinese. Thus, the ethnic Chinese network and the
cultural distance are two distinct aspects.
In this study, we further explore how institutional distance interacts with ethnic Chi-
nese network and cultural distance in shaping the FDI location choice in China. In
particular, we examine whether a large ethnic Chinese network and cultural similarity
could reduce the sensitivity of FDI location choice toward regional institutional variations
even for FIEs from institutionally distant source countries/areas. It is conjectured that a
large ethnic Chinese network can spread information and knowledge about Chinas busi-
ness environment and informal institutions, and can make FIEs more likely to hire ethic
Chinese employees to facilitate their exploration of Chinas market and establishment of
connections with local businesses and governments. At the same time, cultural similarity
between the FDI source country and China could allow FIEs, no matter having many
ethnic Chinese employees or not, to understand quickly Chinas business environment
and adapt relatively easily to local culture and business practices and relatively easily
overcome the institutional barriers to FDI. Thus, we expect that both a large ethnic Chi-
nese network and cultural proximity could mitigate the negative impacts of institutional
distances on FDI entry.
Using an extensive rm-level dataset on FIEs in China, we employ discrete choice
model developed by McFadden (1974) to examine the factors determining the locational
choices of FDI. Our empirical analysis shows that FIEs from source countries that are
more remote institutionally from the Chinese mainland exhibit a higher degree of sensi-
tivity toward regional economic institutions in their choice of FDI location.
One possible challenge to the results is that Independence of Irrelevant Alternative
(IIA) condition could be violated in the conditional logit model framework. However,
by excluding regions possibly being outliers does not change our results. Moreover,
nested logit and mixed logit estimation, which relax IIA condition to some extent, are
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very similar to the baseline results.
Interestingly, we also detect a pattern of asymmetric sensitivity toward institutional
quality, i.e., FIEs coming from countries with better institutions than China are more
sensitive to institutional di¤erence and there is no e¤ect of institutional di¤erence on
FIEs from countries with worse institutions than China. This may be because FIEs from
countries with worse institutions are endowed with the knowhow to deal with government
expropriation (e.g., corruption) in a poor intuitional environment like that of China.
Therefore, statistically there is no e¤ect of institutional di¤erence on location choice of
these rms.
Institutional distance could also cast di¤erentiated impacts on location choice by Joint
Ventures (JVs) and Wholly-owned Enterprises (WOEs). Depending on whether FIEs
come from institutionally close or distant countries/areas, we expect that JVs and WOEs
from di¤erent source countries exhibit di¤erent sensitivities to the variation in regional
economic institutions in location choice. More specically, if WOEs are more sensitive to
regional institutions than do JVs, this di¤erentiation will be more salient for FDI coming
from more institutionally distant source countries/areas. In the empirical analysis, we do
nd that WOEs exhibit stronger responses to regional economic institutions in location
choice than JVs do when they come from sources that are more institutionally remote
from China.
The deterrent e¤ect of institutional distance on FDI entry is mitigated for FIEs coming
from the source countries with the above-sample-mean proportion of ethnic Chinese in
their overall populations, and this e¤ect is signicant only forWOEs and foreign-majority-
owned joint ventures. This suggests that the information sharing about Chinese business
environment and the hiring of ethnic Chinese employees brought about by the presence
of a high ethnic Chinese network could potentially facilitate the adaptation of FIEs to
the institutional environment in China. Some dimensions of cultural proximity produce
similar results, but di¤erent dimensions of cultural distance do not produce consistent
results.
There are several existing studies that use host country institutions to explain the
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inuential "Lucas Paradox" (Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych, 2008; Papaioannou,
2009). However, they do not include institutional di¤erence between the host and source
countries in the regression, which could be the essence in explaining "Lucas Paradox". In
contrast, work by Habib and Zurawicki (2002), Darby, Desbordes, and Wooton (2010),
Aleksynska and Havrylchyk (2013) do examine the e¤ect of institutional di¤erence on
FDI capital ows. Nevertheless, our paper makes a rst attempt to investigate the
e¤ect of institutional di¤erence on FDI location choice within the largest developing
country. Furthermore, this study serves as the rst attempt to explore whether ethnic
Chinese network or cultural proximity help mitigate the negative impacts of institutional
distance on FDI entry. Broadly speaking, by emphasizing the inuence of institutional
di¤erence in the context of China, our paper contribute to the literature investigating the
determinants of FDI location choice (Head, Ries, and Swenson, 1995; Wei, 2000; Head
and Mayer, 2004).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our empirical
strategy. Section 3 describes the data and variables. Section 4 lays out the empirical
results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Estimation Strategy
2.1 A Discrete Choice Model of Location Choice
To model the location choice of foreign multinationals in China, we use the discrete
choice framework (Train, 2003). Specically, assume that the perceived prot of foreign
multinational n (from country c) can make by investing in region j at time t has the
following linear deterministic function
njt = X
0
jtnt + ntRjt + "
n
jt; (1)
where Xjt is a vector of regional time-varying characteristics, such as size of the mar-
ket, infrastructure, education, government policies, agglomeration degree, etc; Rjt is our
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regressor of interest, the regional measure of institutional quality; and "jt is a random
shock to rm prot.
Multinational n chooses to invest in region i among all alternatives if and only if the
potential prot earned in region i is the highest , i.e.,
P ni = Prob (
n
it > 
n
kt8k 6= i) ; (2)
where k; i 2 J and J is the set of all potential alternatives (i.e., in our setting, regions
in China); and P ni is the probability of multinational n choosing region i. Assume in
the baseline estimation that "jt is independently, identically distributed with the Type
I extreme value function (i.e., F (") = e e
 "
). The probability function (2) can then be
simplied as
P ni =
eX
0
itnt+ntRitP
j2J e
X0jtnt+ntRjt
; (3)
and coe¢ cients fnt; ntg can be estimated by using the maximum likelihood method.
Note that the focus of this paper is to investigate the di¤erential impacts of insti-
tutional quality on the location choice of foreign multinationals from di¤erent source
countries. To reduce the number of estimates, we make two simplications. First, we
assume that other regional determinants Xjt have the same impacts on all foreign multi-
nationals, regardless of where they come from, i.e., nt . Second, we assume that the
value of regional institutional quality in China varies across foreign multinationals with
the institutional quality levels in their home countries, i.e.,
nt  Mct; (4)
where Mct is the institutional quality in foreign multinational ns home country c. Later
we will relax this assumption by allowing a random part in the taste variation across
multinationals from di¤erent countries, i.e.,
nt  Mct + ct; (5)
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where ct is a random variation.
2.2 Identication
The identication assumptions in estimating equation (3) are: (1) the error term "njt is in-
dependently and identically distributed, or the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives
(IIA) condition; and (2) the error term "njt follows a Type I extreme value distribution. To
check whether the IIA condition holds in our setting and whether our results are sensitive
to the Type I extreme value distribution, we discuss in the following several robustness
checks that have been used in the literature.
First, we saturate the baseline equation with region-specic constant j. Train (1986)
shows that including alternative-specic constant allows to estimate equation (3) in the
presence of some forms of IIA violation. In studying the e¤ect of industrial grouping on
FDI location choice, Blonigen, Ellis, and Fausten (2005) include the alternative-specic
constant to control for the potential violation of the IIA condition.
Second, we estimate equation (3) for several sub-samples. A corollary of the IIA
condition is that estimates from a sub-set of all alternatives should be similar to that from
the full set. Head, Ries, and Swenson (1995) and Blonigen, Ellis, and Fausten (2005) use
this robustness check in their study of the e¤ect of agglomeration and industrial grouping
on FDI location choice, respectively.
Third, we relax the assumption of the IIA condition by allowing the correlation among
some alternatives but not the others. Specically, we assume that foreign multinationals
partition China into several super-regions (called nests) and the IIA condition holds for
regions in the same super-region but not for those across super-regions. In other words,
foreign multinationals rst choose a super-region and then a region within that super-
region to invest. This framework is referred to as the nested logit model and has been
widely used in the literature as a check on the IIA condition (see, for example, Head and
Mayer, 2004; Dean, Lovely, and Wang, 2009).
Finally, we estimate a more exible model, namely the mixed logit model, which
allows the error term "njt to follow any distribution (the relaxation of the identication
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assumption (2)), any arbitrary correlation among "njt (the relaxation of the identication
assumption (1)), and the potential randomness in the taste variation (equation (5)).
Specically, the mixed logit model decomposes "njt into a part containing all the correlation
and heteroskedasticity (and following any type of distribution) and the other part taking
i.i.d. Type I extreme value. This method has now been increasingly used in the literature,
see, for example, Bhat (1998), Revelt and Train (1998), and Brownstone and Train (1999).
3 Data and Variables
Our data come from a large dataset of Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIEs) in China,
compiled by the China National Bureau of Statistics. This dataset contains 150,602
FIEs in 2001, accounting for 74.44% of the total 202,306 FIEs in China as reported by
the China Statistical Yearbook 2002. Among them, 141,668 enterprises are engaged in
the manufacturing sector, covering 75.45% of the total number of foreign manufacturing
enterprises in China in 2001.
We focus on the 1993-2001 period as the information about our key explanatory
variable (i.e., the measure of institutional quality) is not available before 1993 and the FDI
ow into China took o¤ only since 1992. After deleting those FIEs without registration
dates and involving individual foreign investors, we are left with 31,574 manufacturing
FIEs from 123 countries in the world. With just one year data, we follow the common
practice in the literature to retrieve information on the time and location each FIE made
its investment by using the reported registration year and location in 2001 (see also
Blonigen, Ellis, and Fausten, 2005). However, the cost of doing this is that we implicitly
assume there is no change in the location after the investment. To check whether our
results are sensitive to this data limitation, we later estimate a sub-sample of FIEs that
invested in 2001, for which we should have the precise information about their locations.
The regressors of interest in this paper are the institutional quality of di¤erent re-
gions in China and that of home countries of each FIE. To measure institutional quality
in Chinas regions1, we resort to the dataset of Survey of Chinas Private Enterprises,
1Since property rights protection is the most important aspect of economic institutions (North, 1990),
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conducted jointly by the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of China, the All China Industry and Commerce Federation, and
the China Society of Private Economy at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in
1995, 1997, 2000, and 2002. Following the recent literature on institutions (e.g., Johnson,
McMillan, and Woodru¤, 2002; Cull and Xu, 2005), we measure regional institutional
quality by the average percentage of revenue spent on extralegal payments to the govern-
ment (Tan Pai in Chinese) of all private rms in that region. This is expected to be a
proxy measure of the severity of government expropriation in the region.
In order to measure institutional quality, especially government exproriation of prop-
erty rights, of home country of FIEs so as to match the corresponding measure for Chinas
regions, following Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) and Acemoglu and Johnson
(2005), we utilize Polity IVs index on the constraint on the executive. Since we are more
concerned about the expropriation behavior of the state, a higher level of constraint on
the executive in the country indicates better property rights protection. In Polity IV
project, the index of the constraint on executive ranges from 1 to 7 with a higher value
indicating more constraints on the executive.
The key regressor in our regressions is constructed as the product of the home country
institutional quality of FIEs and the property rights protection index of di¤erent regions
in China. A larger value of this product indicates higher institutional distance between
the home country institutional quality and regional institutional quality in China. Thus,
a negative and signicant estimated coe¢ cient indicates a higher degree of sensitivity of
FIE location choice to regional institution variation in China for an FIE from a source
country/area that is institutionally more distant from China.
In this study, we also examine whether ethnic Chinese networks and cultural prox-
imity can mitigate the negative impacts of institutional distance on FDI location choice.
To gauge the size of ethnic Chinese networks, we use the data on the ethnic Chinese
population and overall population of FDI source countries in 1990 from Poston, Mao,
and Yu (1994) and Rauch and Trindade (2002). We calculate the relative size of ethnic
we use property rights protection and institutions interchangeably in the paper.
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Chinese networks, i.e., the proportion of ethnic Chinese in the overall population in each
FDI source country.
At the same time, we use Hofstedes dimensions of culture index to assess the cultural
distance between FDI source countries and China. This culture index is a quite popular
measure of cultural proximity of di¤erent countries. It examines several dimensions of
culture such as power distance, collectivism vs. individualism, femininity vs. masculinity.
Ethnic Chinese networks and cultural distance are interrelated to some extent, but
they are largely two distinct aspects. Cultural distance index focuses on the fundamental
and mainstream culture of FDI source countries. A large ethnic Chinese networks might
narrow cultural distance between the FDI source country and China (e.g., the case of
Singapore). Nonetheless, for most FDI source countries, the fraction of ethnic Chinese in
the overall population is rather small. The ethnic Chinese community can hardly change
the mainstream culture of the FDI source country. For example, average percentage of
Chinese in foreign countries is 2.4 and percentage of Chinese in U.S. and England is
only 0.66 and 0.22 respectively. Interestingly, Japan is a case with small ethnic Chinese
network (0.12 percent) but close to Chinese culture: absolute di¤erence of power distance
to China is only 1 while average di¤erence of power distance of foreign countries to China
is 19.
To alleviate the concern of omitted variable bias, we include a number of control
variables that potentially correlate with both institutions and FIEsdecision on location.
Following Head, Ries, and Swenson (1995), Blonigen, Ellis, and Fausten (2005), and Liu,
Lovely, and Ondrich (2010), we include agglomeration which is proxied by Nirct
Tict
where
Nirct is number of FIEs in 4 digit industry i of region r and country c in year t and Tict is
number of FIEs in industry i of country c in year t. We expect that FIEs are more likely
to locate in regions with more similarrms to enjoy informational and manufacturing
advantages. In addition, we also include controls of infrastructure (Debaere, Lee, and
Paik, 2010), regional education (Du, Lu, and Tao, 2008), regional GDP2 (Head and
Mayer, 2004), and the existence of special economic zones or economic and technological
2A proxy for market potential.
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development zones in the region (Du, Lu, and Tao, 2012).
Table 1 reports summary statistics of variables used in the regression. The key variable
of interest, institutional di¤erence, ranges from 0 to 0.213 with a standard deviation of
0.033 and other variables are within reasonable range. Since our dependent variable and
institutional di¤erence are at rm-region-country-year level, their observation number is
915646. All other variables are at region-year level, their observation number is thus
29*9=261.
In the sample, we also nd some stylized facts in supporting our story. For example,
FIEs coming from U.S. whose institutional quality is 7 in 2001, invested 84.8% of their
capital in eastern provinces3 whose institutional quality is widely considered as sound in
China. In contrast, for FIEs coming from Pakistan whose institutional quality is 1 in
2001, only 26.4% of their capital are invested in Eastern provinces.
4 Estimation Results
4.1 Main Results
Table 2 reports our main estimation results from equation (3). All standard errors are
robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity.
Column 1 presents the estimation results that includes the regional government ex-
propriation index in China but does not incorporate institutional di¤erence. It shows
that the estimated coe¢ cient of the variable government expropriation is negative and
highly statistically signicant, i.e., -10.787 with a standard error of 2.755. Clearly, gov-
ernment expropriation deters FDI entry. This is consistent with the earlier ndings that
FIEs choose to make investment in regions with good institutions (Du, Lu, and Tao,
2008). In particular, if we reduce the level of government expropriation of Anhui to that
of Shanghai in year 2001, the probability of FIEschoosing Anhui as the location of their
investment would increase by 0.008.
In column 2, we replace regional institutions with our key regressor of institutional
3Eastern provinces include Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong,
Guangdong and Hainan.
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di¤erence in the regression. We nd that the e¤ect of regional institutional quality on
location choice of FIEs is negatively and signicantly moderated by institutional quality
of FIEshome country. More specically, a typical FIE is less likely to locate in a region
when the institutional di¤erence between this region and the FIEs home country is large.
According to the estimate of -1.652 (s.e.=0.414), for a Pakistan rm located in Beijing,
if the institutional quality of home country increase from Pakistan to U.S., this would
decrease the probability of that rm located in Beijing by 0.47.
In addition, it seems that the regression results for most of the control variables
make economic sense. For example, FIEs are more likely to locate in regions with a
higher degree of concentration of "similar" rms, better infrastructure, a pool of better
educated workers, higher market demand and more favorable policies regarding foreign
direct investment.
4.2 Robustness Check
In Tables 3 and 4, we perform a number of robustness checks on our main results.
In column 1 of Table 3, we add region-specic constant to our baseline regression
model. Note that time invariant variables Special Economic Zone and Economic and
Technological Development Zone are omitted due to perfect multicollinearity. Although
the magnitude of the estimated coe¢ cient of institutional di¤erence drops by approx-
imately 25%, the addition of region-specic constant has little e¤ect on the sign and
signicance of estimated coe¢ cient of institutional di¤erence.
As a check for IIA assumption, we conduct several subsample analyses in columns 2-5
of Table 3. Column 2 reports regression results of a subsample without FIEs in regions
with the lowest three entries (i.e., Qinghai, Ningxia, and Gansu) and column 3 reports
results without observations in regions with top three entries (i.e., Shandong, Jiangsu,
and Shanghai). It appears that excluding FIEs in regions serving as outliersdoes not
change our main results qualitatively.
One potential concern in Table 2 is that northeastern provinces in China (i.e., Hei-
longjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning) may have received state resources as stipulated by the
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national strategy of economic development because of the agglomeration of state-owned
enterprises in heavy industry in these regions. Therefore these provinces may not be lo-
cation choices equivalent to other regions for FIEs. However, in column 4, the estimation
results excluding northeastern regions are very similar to our main results.
Another related concern is that western regions4 in China are typically underdeveloped
and they are more likely to be settled by minority groups which naturally change the
political environment to some extent. Consequently, western regions might not be similar
choices for FIEs too. Yet, column 5 shows that eliminating western regions of China has
little e¤ect on our main results.
Column 6 presents estimation results for nested logit model where IIA assumption is
relaxed. In nested logit model, we divide China into 4 super regions. The rst super-
region includes Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, and Inner Mongolia; the second super-
region includes Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, and Shandong;
the third-super region includes Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan,
Sichuan, Guizhou, and Yunnan; and the fourth super-region includes Shaanxi, Gansu,
Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning. We can imagine that FIEs
rst decide on entering which super-region and then choose a region to locate their in-
vestment within that super-region. Again, the nested logit model regression results are
very similar to our baseline results.
Following the recent literature (Chang and Lusk, 2011), column 7 reports the esti-
mation results using mixed logit model which relaxes the distribution assumption of the
error term. Obviously, the estimated coe¢ cient on institutional di¤erence is still negative
and highly signicant, -1.653 (s.e.=0.352).
In our base sample, we assume that after an FIE chooses a region to invest in year
t, it stays in that region to year 2001. Although it seems to be reasonable, change of
FIE location after entry still occurs occasionally. In column 1 of Table 4, we restrict our
regression analysis to the sample of FIEs that entered China in year 2001 so that we have
the precise location information on FIEs. Actually, the negative e¤ect of the institutional
4Western regions include Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Xizang,
Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang.
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di¤erence on FIE location choice remains statistically signicantly negative and becomes
even larger in magnitude.
As the last robustness check, in column 2 of Table 4, we exclude FIEs from countries
with less than 10 entries over the 1993-2001 period. Again, estimation results are very
similar to those reported in Table 2.
4.3 Understanding the Impacts of Institutional Distance
So far we have observed that institutional distance raises the sensitivity of FDI location
choice to regional institution variation. We conjecture that the enhanced sensitivity of
FIEs from institutionally distant countries stems from the lack of skill and knowhow
of these FIEs to deal with predatory local government o¢ cials in China. If this is the
underlying reason, we expect that this pattern should be more concentrated in the group
of FIEs from source countries that are institutionally better than China, and the pattern
should be more salient for wholly-owned FIEs than for joint ventures.
Firstly, we examine the di¤erences in the sensitivity between FIEs coming from insti-
tutionally better and those from institutionally worse source countries. It is conceivable
that FIEs from the source countries whose governments are more predatory than those of
China should nd it easy to deal with local govenrments in China by using similar strate-
gies and tactics from their business operations in their home countries. Hence, FIEs from
countries with weaker property rights protection may be naturally not sensitive to local
government expropriation in China.
To investigate this issue, we create two dummy variables indicating whether institu-
tional quality of home country of FIEs is higher or lower than that of China and interact
these two dummies with institutional di¤erence. The two variables are denoted as positive
institutional distance and negative institutional distance, respectively. We expect that
there are no signicant e¤ects of institutional di¤erence on FIE location choice for FIEs
coming from countries with worse institutions than those of China, and there are nega-
tive and signicant e¤ects of institutional di¤erence for FIEs from countries having better
institutions than those of Chinas. Estimation results in column 1 of Table 5 indicate
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that this is indeed the case. Only the variable Positive Institutional Di¤erence produces
statistically signicant and negative impacts on FDI location choice. This corroborates
our conjecture that the e¤ects of institutional distance on FIE location choice stem from
the lack of knowledge and experience of FIEs to deal with predatory local bureaucrats in
the host country.
Secondly, we examine another possible heterogeneous response, i.e., if FIEs can nd
a local partner to form a joint venture, joint venture rms should be less sensitive to
institutional di¤erence than FIEs having entered China as wholly owned enterprises.
This is because local partners are more familiar with local institutional environment and
probably have many connections with local bureaucrats so that they would help FIEs
to alleviate the entry cost created by institutional di¤erence. Columns 2 and 3 report
results for joint ventures and wholly owned enterprises, respectively. Consistent with our
conjecture, we nd that only wholly owned FIEs exhibit statistically signicant responses
to institutional distance, whereas joint venture rms do not display signicant sensitivity
to institutional distance.
4.4 Ethnic Chinese Networks and Institutional Distance
In Table 7, we examine the sensitivity of FIE location choice toward regional institution
strength in two groups of source countries, i.e., those with above mean proportion of ethnic
Chinese population and those with below mean one. The results show clearly that the
estimated coe¢ cient of institutional distance is statistically signicant and negative only
in the group of source countries with below-mean fraction of ethnic Chinese population.
In other words, only FIEs from the group of source countries having relatively small ethnic
Chinese networks display statistically signicant sensitivity toward regional government
expropriation in their business location choice.
Moreover, we further examine the heterogeneous responses of di¤erent types of FIEs
from source countries with below-mean and above-mean ethnic Chinese networks toward
regional institution variation. We divide the sample of FIEs into wholly-owned FIEs
and joint ventures. In some regressions, we further partition joint ventures into foreign-
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majority-owned joint ventures (foreign ownership share is more than 70%) and foreign-
minority-owned joint ventures (foreign ownership share is less than 30%). Table 7 presents
the regression results. Clearly, no type of FIEs produces statistically signicant estimated
coe¢ cients for institutional distance in the group of source countries with above-mean
ethnic Chinese networks. In contrast, in the group of source countries with below-mean
ethnic Chinese networks, wholly-owned FIEs and foreign-majority-owned joint ventures
display signicant sensitivity toward regional institution variation, while FIEs of other
types do not produce signicant results.
Combining these two groups of results, we can observe that the presence of a large
ethnic Chinese network can spread information on Chinese business environment, and
familiarize the business community in the source country with Chinese culture, practices
and informal institutions. FIEs in source countries with a high ethnic Chinese network
are also more likely to hire ethnic Chinese employees to help explore the Chinese market,
build up business connections and establish connections with local government o¢ cials.
These factors all facilitate FIEs to overcome the barriers to business expansion generated
by institutional distance.
4.5 Cultural Distance and Institutional Distance
Finally, we examine whether the proximity in mainstream culture between the FDI source
country and China can mitigate the negative impacts of institutional distance on FIE lo-
cation choice. For each culture index, we divide the sample into two subsamples: the
subsample of FDI source countries with low cultural distance (i.e., the di¤erence in cul-
ture index value is smaller than the mean value), and the subsample of FDI source
countries with high cultural distance (i.e., the di¤erence in culture index value is larger
than the mean value). Then, we carry out regressions to investigate the signicance of
the sensitivity of FIE location choice toward regional institution di¤erences.
Table 8 presents the regression results. Basically we do not observe consistent results.
For some indices such as femininity vs. masculinity, the regression results show that only
FIEs from the group of FDI source countries with high cultural distance with China ex-
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hibit signicant sensitivity toward regional institution variation. Nonetheless, for indices
such as individualism vs. collectivism and power distance, we obtain opposite results.
These results suggest that the proximity in mainstream culture could hardly produce
knowhow and skill to overcome the negative e¤ects of institutional distance on FDI entry.
5 Conclusion
FDI is considered as one of the driving forces behind the growth miracle of China. In this
paper, we investigate whether FIEs are more likely to locate in Chinas regions whose
institutional quality are similar to their home countries.
Using an extensive rm-level dataset on FIEs in China, we employ the framework of
conditional logit model developed by McFadden (1974) to examine the e¤ect of institu-
tional di¤erence on locational choices of FDI. Our empirical results show that FIEs are
less likely to locate in Chinas regions whose institutional di¤erence is large to their home
countries. We also document that this relationship is not driven by outliers and is robust
to di¤erent model specications.
Interestingly, we nd that FIEs from countries with worse institutions than China are
not sensitive to the institutional di¤erence between Chinas regional intuitional quality
and source countriesinstitutional quality. Moreover, we nd that institutional di¤erence
play no role if FIEs could nd a local partner to form a joint venture enterprise. Fur-
thermore, we nd that ethnic Chinese networks and cultural proximity could partially
mitigate the negative e¤ect of institutional di¤erence on locational choices of FDI.
Since FIEs are more likely to locate in countries/regions whose institutional quality
is similar to their home country, the nding of our paper suggests that if policy makers
intend to attract FDI to their country/region, they should pay much more attention
to FIEs coming from countries whose institutional quality is similar to the institutional
quality of their own country/region. Providing favorable taxes or lowering license barrier
for FIEs coming from countries whose instructional di¤erences to the host country/region
are small may be possible instruments.
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                                                                    Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable  Observations Mean Standard Deviation  Minimum Maximum
FDI Entry Dummy  915646  0.034 0.182  0  1 
Regional Institutions  261  0.006 0.004  0  0.030 
Institutional Difference  915646  0.035 0.033  0  0.213 
Agglomeration  261  0.034 0.074  0  1 
Highway Density  261  5.378 0.851  2.821  6.865 
Education  261  4.556 4.506  0.8  40.651 
Log of GDP  261  7.299 0.983  4.421  9.176 
Special Economic Zone  261  0.375 0.485  0  1 
Economic and Technological Development Zone 261  0.548 0.499  0  1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
                                                Table 2: Main Results 
  (1)  (2) 
Institutions  ‐10.787***   
  (2.755)   
Institutional Difference    ‐1.652*** 
    (0.414) 
Agglomeration  9.302***  9.303*** 
  (0.057)  (0.057) 
Highway Density  0.126***  0.126*** 
  (0.020)  (0.020) 
Education  0.031***  0.031*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Log of GDP  0.273***  0.273*** 
  (0.016)  (0.016) 
Special Economic Zone  0.215***  0.215*** 
  (0.028)  (0.028) 
Economic and Technological Development Zone  0.473***  0.473*** 
  (0.034)  (0.034) 
Number of Choices  29  29 
Number of Firms  31574  31574 
Observations  915646  915646 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *** significant at the 1 percent level;   
** significant at the 5 percent level; * significant at the 5 percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
                                                                                          Table 3: Robustness Checks 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
  Adding  Region‐specific 
Constant 
No  Regions  with 
Lowest  Three 
Entries 
No Regions with 
Top  Three 
Entries 
No  Northeastern 
Regions 
No  Western 
Regions 
Nested 
Logit 
Mixed 
Logit 
Institutional Difference  ‐1.115**  ‐1.625***  ‐2.537***  ‐3.359***  ‐2.226***  ‐0.847***  ‐1.653*** 
  (0.463)  (0.409)  (0.604)  (0.495)  (0.434)  (0.241)  (0.352) 
Agglomeration  9.284***  9.283***  13.551***  9.620***  8.922***  7.162***  9.303*** 
  (0.059)  (0.057)  (0.139)  (0.069)  (0.055)  (0.062)  (0.055) 
Highway Density  ‐0.041  0.083***  0.156***  0.277***  0.181***  0.048***  0.126*** 
  (0.086)  (0.019)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.032)  (0.014)  (0.024) 
Education  0.006  0.031***  0.023***  0.019***  0.043***  0.010***  0.032*** 
  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Log of GDP  0.312  0.222***  0.290***  0.275***  0.188***  0.103***  0.273*** 
  (0.192)  (0.017)  (0.022)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.010)  (0.018) 
Special Economic Zone    0.252***  0.140***  0.195***  0.413***  0.056***  0.215*** 
    (0.028)  (0.036)  (0.031)  (0.034)  (0.016)  (0.027) 
Economic  and  Technological 
Development Zone 
  0.429***  0.343***  0.414***  0.271***  0.120***  0.473*** 
  (0.032)  (0.040)  (0.038)  (0.040)  (0.018)  (0.035) 
Number of Choices  29  26  26  26  19  29  29 
Number of Firms  31574  31452  18603  27646  29823  31574  31595 
Observations  915646  817752  483678  718796  566637  915646  916255 
Log Pseudo Likelihood  ‐35079  ‐35179  ‐16670  ‐27773  ‐31608  ‐34134  ‐141632 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *** significant at the 1 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; * significant at the 5 percent level. 
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                                          Table 4: Additional Results 
  (1)  (2) 
  Firms  in 
2001 
No  Countries  with  Less 
than 10 Entries 
Institutional Difference  ‐3.552***  ‐1.652*** 
  (1.041)  (0.414) 
Agglomeration  8.122***  9.301*** 
  (0.121)  (0.057) 
Highway Density  ‐0.204***  0.126*** 
  (0.054)  (0.020) 
Education  0.037***  0.031*** 
  (0.003)  (0.002) 
Log of GDP  0.313***  0.273*** 
  (0.042)  (0.016) 
Special Economic Zone  0.083  0.215*** 
  (0.201)  (0.028) 
Economic and Technological Development Zone  0.881***  0.473*** 
  (0.199)  (0.034) 
Number of Choices  29  29 
Number of Firms  5156  31377 
Observations  149524  909933 
Log Pseudo Likelihood  ‐6170  ‐35558 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *** significant at the 1 percent level;   
** significant at the 5 percent level; * significant at the 5 percent level. 
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                                      Table 5: Heterogeneous Responses 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
    Joint 
Venture 
Wholly 
Owned 
Positive Institutional Difference  ‐1.645***     
  (0.416)     
Negative Institutional Difference  ‐2.185     
  (36.868)     
Institutional Difference    0.088  ‐4.655*** 
    (0.521)  (0.684) 
Agglomeration  9.303***  9.717***  8.757*** 
  (0.057)  (0.077)  (0.083) 
Highway Density  0.126***  0.042*  0.252*** 
  (0.020)  (0.025)  (0.032) 
Education  0.031***  0.033***  0.029*** 
  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Log of GDP  0.272***  0.399***  0.117*** 
  (0.016)  (0.022)  (0.024) 
Special Economic Zone  0.215***  0.057  0.455*** 
  (0.028)  (0.036)  (0.047) 
Economic and Technological Development Zone  0.474***  0.293***  0.791*** 
  (0.034)  (0.041)  (0.059) 
Number of Choices  29  29  29 
Number of Firms  31574  19070  12504 
Observations  915646  553030  362616 
Log Pseudo Likelihood  ‐35561  ‐21407  ‐13977 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *** significant at the 1 percent level;   
** significant at the 5 percent level; * significant at the 5 percent level. 
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                        Table 6: Ethnic Chinese Networks and Institutional Difference 
  (1)  (2) 
  Ethnic  Chinese  is 
above sample mean 
Ethnic  Chinese  is 
below sample mean
Institutional Difference  ‐0.943  ‐1.673*** 
  (1.771)  (0.425) 
Agglomeration  10.287***  9.162*** 
  (0.175)  (0.061) 
Highway Density  0.283***  0.106*** 
  (0.067)  (0.021) 
Education  0.007  0.035*** 
  (0.007)  (0.002) 
Log of GDP  0.184***  0.284*** 
  (0.050)  (0.017) 
Special Economic Zone  0.027  0.242*** 
  (0.085)  (0.030) 
Economic and Technological Development Zone  0.310 ***  0.499*** 
  (0.098)  (0.036) 
Number of Choices  29  29 
Number of Firms  5612  25962 
Observations  162748  752898 
Log Pseudo Likelihood  ‐3673  ‐31856 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *** significant at the 1 percent level;   
** significant at the 5 percent level; * significant at the 5 percent level. 
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                                                                        Table 7: Ethnic Chinese Networks and Institutional Difference: JV, WOE, Majority and Minority 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
            Ethnic Chinese is above sample mean              Ethnic Chinese is below sample mean 
  JV  WOE  Majority  Minority  JV  WOE  Majority  Minority 
Institutional Difference  0.042  ‐2.767  0.828  0.328  0.095  ‐4.698***  ‐3.093***  ‐0.446 
  (2.248)  (2.885)  (2.566)  (3.069)  (0.535)  (0.701)  (0.641)  (0.806) 
Agglomeration  10.686***  9.746***  9.585***  11.517***  9.580***  8.610***  8.743***  9.332*** 
  (0.237)  (0.256)  (0.230)  (0.458)  (0.082)  (0.088)  (0.084)  (0.130) 
Highway Density  0.118  0.556***  0.575***  ‐0.032  0.032  0.216***  0.307***  ‐0.188*** 
  (0.081)  (0.120)  (0.114)  (0.120)  (0.026)  (0.033)  (0.034)  (0.036) 
Education  0.013  ‐0.002  0.003  0.009  0.035***  0.033***  0.037***  0.036*** 
  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.013)  (0.003)      (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Log of GDP  0.387***  ‐0.017  0.046  0.238**  0.401***  0.137***  0.167***  0.430*** 
  (0.070)  (0.068)  (0.064)  (0.121)  (0.023)  (0.026)  (0.024)  (0.037) 
Special Economic Zone  ‐0.228**  0.444***  0.312**  ‐0.398**  0.098**  0.457***  0.487***  0.136** 
  (0.108)  (0.142)  (0.124)  (0.185)  (0.038)  (0.049)  (0.046)  (0.064) 
ETDZ  0.159  0.437***  0.492***  0.460**  0.311***  0.848***  0.780***  0.204*** 
  (0.121)  (0.168)  (0.148)  (0.212)  (0.044)  (0.064)  (0.061)  (0.069) 
Number of Choices  29  29  29  29  29  29  29  29 
Number of Firms  3404  2208  2596  1277  15666  10296  11982  5925 
Observations  98716  64032  75284  37033  454314  298584  347478  171825 
Log Pseudo Likelihood  ‐2145  ‐1495  ‐1832  ‐717  ‐19243  ‐12463  ‐14132  ‐7631 
Notes: Robust  standard  errors  are  in  parenthesis.  JV  and WOE  denote  joint  venture  enterprises  and wholly‐owned  enterprises  respectively. Majority  is  joint 
venture enterprises whose foreign ownership share is larger than 70%. Minority is joint venture enterprises whose foreign ownership share is less than 30%. ETDZ 
is Economic and Technological Development Zone. *** significant at the 1 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; * significant at the 5 percent level. 
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                                                                            Table 8: Cultural Distance and Institutional Difference 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Masculinity Difference  Individualism Difference  Power Distance Difference 
  Above mean  Below Mean  Above Mean  Below Mean  Above Mean  Below Mean 
Institutional Difference  ‐3.670***  ‐0.544  ‐0.913  ‐2.194***  ‐0.004  ‐1.657*** 
  (0.697)  (0.519)  (0.590)  (0.585)  (32.179)  (0.415) 
Agglomeration  9.556***  9.207***  10.655***  8.600***  58.173***  9.299*** 
  (0.096)  (0.071)  (0.104)  (0.067)  (1.907)  (0.057) 
Highway Density  0.176***  0.109***  0.231***  0.030  ‐0.001  0.125*** 
  (0.035)  (0.024)  (0.034)  (0.024)  (3.154)  (0.020) 
Education  0.020***  0.036***  0.013***  0.044***  0.00004  0.032*** 
  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.434)  (0.002) 
Log of GDP  0.313***  0.249***  0.279***  0.259***  ‐0.00008  0.272*** 
  (0.029)  (0.020)  (0.026)  (0.021)  (1.569)  (0.016) 
Special Economic Zone  0.210***  0.215***  0.068  0.350***  1.284  0.216*** 
  (0.049)  (0.0350  (0.042)  (0.039)  (2.582)  (0.028) 
ETDZ  0.554***  0.442***  0.264***  0.681***  1.806  0.474*** 
  (0.061)  (0.041)  (0.050)  (0.047)  (2.174)  (0.034) 
Number of Choices  29  29  29  29  29  29 
Number of Firms  10971  19843  13973  16841  58  30756 
Observations  318159  575447  405217  488389  1682  891924 
Log Pseudo Likelihood  ‐12138  ‐23223  ‐14812  ‐20378  ‐11  ‐35381 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ETDZ is Economic and Technological Development Zone. *** significant at the 1 percent level;   
** significant at the 5 percent level; * significant at the 5 percent level. 
 
 
